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In this paper we provide evidence on international equity investments among 
eleven of  the leading industrial nations during the period  1985 to 1990. Our 
purpose is to document which countries have been the largest target nations 
and which have been the most active acquirers. We  also examine factors that 
restrict and encourage equity investments between countries. 
We  find that international equity investments grew tenfold between  1985 
and 1990 and currently account for about 30 percent of  all corporate equity 
investments. In dollar terms, the United States is by far the largest target coun- 
try for international equity investments and accounted for 60 percent of  all 
international investments between 1985 and 1990. However, when we control 
for differences in country size, the United States ranks only third among target 
countries (behind the United Kingdom and Canada). At the other extreme, the 
Japanese equity market is effectively off limits to foreign investors. There were 
few significant foreign equity investments in Japan in the study period. 
The United Kingdom is the most active acquirer nation, both in dollar terms 
and adjusting for country size, and accounts for 26 percent of all international 
acquisitions. U.S. French, and Japanese companies are also large acquirers in 
dollar terms, and each country accounts for about  14 percent of  worldwide 
equity investments. However, when we  control for country size, the United 
States ranks tenth out of eleven countries in investments abroad. 
International activity in target countries is explained in part by  (1) regula- 
tions that seek to deter foreign investment, (2) differences across countries in 
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ownership structure and corporate control markets, and (3) target countries’ 
recent growth. Neither changes in real exchange rates between target and ac- 
quirer countries nor growth rates of  acquirer countries are important factors 
explaining international investment patterns. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 describes the data used in 
the study. International equity investment patterns among target countries and 
the factors explaining the level of investments in target countries are reported 
in section 8.2. In section 8.3  we present a summary of the most active acquirer 
nations, and in section 8.4 we present tests of factors that explain changes in 
international investments between the target and acquirer nations. Our conclu- 
sions are presented in section 8.5. 
8.1  Data 
The data for our analysis are from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) data- 
base of  intercorporate worldwide investments. SDC compiles a list of  these 
transactions from U.S. and foreign news sources, including source documents 
from government agencies, surveys from foreign stock exchanges and invest- 
ment banks, and reports from Financial Times, International  Financing Re- 
view, Reuters, Dow Jones News Services, The Wall Street Journal (Asian and 
U.S. editions), and the New York Times. The database covers intercorporate 
equity investments, regardless of the percentage of ownership acquired. Port- 
folio investments by mutual funds are not reported. 
To be included in our sample, transactions are required to be completed 
deals announced in the period January 1, 1985, through December 3 1, 1990. 
The transactions include investments by both public and private companies in 
other public or private companies. The investments range from acquisitions of 
noncontrolling equity interests to transactions  that transfer complete control to 
the acquirer.’ 
The SDC database provides information on the country of  the acquiring 
firm, the target firm country, and the dollar value of  each acquisition at its 
completion date (expressed in U.S.  dollars at that date). There is some question 
as to how to classify target and acquirer firms’ nations when the entity consid- 
ered is owned by another firm headquartered in a different nation. We identify 
1. To  corroborate the accuracy of the SDC data, international acquisitions of U.S. equity re- 
ported in the database from 1985 to 1990 are compared with the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy- 
sis (BEA) data on international acquisitions of equity stakes exceeding 10 percent in U.S.  firms. 
While there are some differences between BEA and SDC estimates for individual years, the aggre- 
gate acquisitions during these six years are remarkably close. The BEA reports acquisitions of 
$266.8 billion, whereas SDC estimates for investments by eleven countries examined in this study 
are $247.8 billion. There are two important differences between the databases. First, the BEA 
acquisitions are classified by year of completion, but we classify SDC acquisitions by announce- 
ment year. Second, the BEA covers all international equity investments in U.S. firms exceeding 10 
percent ownership, whereas we examine all equity investments by ten industrialized countries. 233  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and Why? 
Table 8.1  International  and Domestic Intercorporate Equity Investments, 
by Year,  1985 to 1990 
Equity Investments 
(U.S. $ millions)  Percentage of Total 
Year  International  Domestic  Total  International  Domestic 
1985  $  10,139  $  113,739  $  123,878  8%  92% 
1986  36,121  245,185  281,306  13  87 
1987  65,334  209,868  275,202  24  76 
1988  86,987  305,302  3  9  2,2 8  9  22  78 
1990  98,421  237,842  336,263  29  71 
1985 to 
1990  414,155  1,463,580  1,877,735  22  78 
1989  117,152  351,644  468,796  25  75 
such a transaction by the parent company’s country rather than by the acquirer’s 
or target firm’s country. For example, the acquisition of Jaguar by Ford Europe, 
a company with a U.S. parent, is classified as a U.S. company investment in 
the United Kingdom. 
In our analysis, we consider investments in or by  firms in the following 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether- 
lands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom,  and the United States. These 
eleven countries account for the bulk of intercorporate investments worldwide. 
Table 8.1 reports data on aggregate international intercorporate investments in 
these countries during the period 1985 to 1990. To provide a benchmark, data 
on domestic intercorporate investments are also reported. International equity 
investments have steadily grown in importance throughout the sample period. 
In 1985, they were valued at about $10 billion and increased tenfold to approx- 
imately $98 billion in 1990.2  In contrast, domestic intercorporate equity invest- 
ments in the eleven countries studied increased only twofold during this same 
period. In 1985, only 8 percent of worldwide equity investments were interna- 
tional. This percentage increased steadily in the succeeding five years and 
reached 29 percent by  1990. 
8.2  Target Countries 
This section examines investment levels in target company countries in the 
period 1985 to 1990. We  then investigate institutional factors that explain dif- 
ferences in intercorporate investments across these countries. 
2.  While we focus on both controlling and noncontrolling international equity acquisitions, the 
bulk of the acquisitions are for control, where control is defined as acquisition of ownership of 51 
percent or more. During the 1985 to 1990 period, controlling acquisitions account for 86 percent 
of all international intercorporate investments. 234  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
8.2.1 
To analyze investment activity by target country, we compute the aggregate 
dollar value of  international investments in each of the eleven industrialized 
countries in the period 1985 to 1990. Table 8.2 reports this aggregate amount, 
as well as international equity investments in each country as a percentage of 
the total for all countries. By  far the largest target nation for intercorporate 
equity investments is the United States, which accounts for 60 percent of  all 
international activity. The United Kingdom and Canada are also important tar- 
get countries, with 16 percent and 8 percent of the total investments. Together, 
these three countries are targets of most of the international equity investments 
in the sample period. At the other extreme, there were few international equity 
acquisitions in Japan during this period. 
To  examine whether there has been a change in international investment 
activity by  target market between 1985 and  1990, we estimate the value of 
international investments each year  for four major regions  (Europe, North 
America, Japan, and Australia). Figure 8.1 shows the annual international in- 
vestments in these target regions. In 1985, North America (primarily the U.S.) 
made up 90 percent of  the target market, with Europe the other 10 percent. 
The major trend over the following five years was a steady decline in the rela- 
tive share of activity in North America and an increase in international acquisi- 
tions in Europe. By 1990, the target markets in the two regions were approxi- 
mately equal in size. 
The above findings do not control for differences in economy sizes across 
countries. We therefore deflate international equity acquisitions in each coun- 
try during the period 1985 to 1990 by its total gross domestic product (GDP) 
Investment Levels by Target Country 
Table 8.2  International  Intercorporate Equity Investments, by Country of 
Target Firm, 1985 to 1990 
International Equity Investments 
Value  Percentage of Gross 
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Fig. 8.1  International intercorporate equity investments, by target market, 
1985 to 1990 
in the same period (translated to U.S. dollars using average exchange rates for 
the year, as reported by the International Monetary Fund [IMF]).  These statis- 
tics also appear in table 8.2. Controlling for size reduces the disparity among 
countries in international activity. While the United States, the United King- 
dom, and Canada remain the dominant target nations, their rankings change. 
The United Kingdom is the largest target market, with international activity of 
1.3 percent of GDP. Activity in Canada is 1.1 percent of GDP; in the U.S., it 
is only 0.9 percent. Australia and the Netherlands also emerge as important 
target nations, with internatidnal investments of  0.6 percent of  GDP. Once 
again, Japan is the lowest-ranked target nation. 
The evidence in table 8.2  shows significant differences in international activ- 
ity across target nations. Two factors potentially explain these differences. Dif- 
ferences in government regulations and tax policies on intercorporate invest- 
ments and differences in equity ownership across countries affect the relative 
feasibility of intercorporate equity investments in general. Further, many of the 
eleven countries studied have regulations which favor domestic investments 
over international activity. Below, we discuss the impact of each of these fac- 
tors on international equity in~estments.~ 
3. Even though we discuss these factors as exogenous, it is likely that corporate control market, 
regulation, and ownership structures are  simultaneously determined in  a corporate governance 
system. 236  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
8.2.2  Effect of Corporate Control Market in Target Countries 
There are several important differences in the nature of  the intercorporate 
investment market in each of the eleven countries studied. First, differences 
exist across countries in the regulation of intercorporate investments. For ex- 
ample, government antitrust regulations in some countries restrict intercorpo- 
rate equity investments which are likely to reduce competition in the domestic 
market. There are differences in government and stock exchange regulations 
on the procedures  required for tender offers for majority control contests. Also, 
there are important differences across countries in the way these antitrust and 
tender offer regulations are administered. Finally, tax law differences across 
countries are likely to affect the relative attractiveness of intercorporate invest- 
ments. These regulations are likely to have a significant impact on both interna- 
tional and domestic equity investment activity. 
A second factor that is likely to influence international equity investments 
is the nature of ownership structure of corporations. In some of the countries 
examined, ownership of equity is concentrated in the hands of long-term in- 
vestors, such as banks, founding families, and the government. These investors 
typically are represented on the company’s board of directors, enabling them 
to monitor current management directly. As a result, these investors are more 
likely to replace poorly performing management themselves, reducing the role 
for hostile acquisitions as a disciplining mechanism. Further, concentrated 
ownership which is friendly to incumbent management is likely to resist the 
attempts of outside investors to wrest control of a corporation in an unfriendly 
transaction. In contrast,  in financial systems where stock ownership is disperse, 
hostile acquisitions are likely to play an important role in changes in corpo- 
rate control. 
Differences in the nature of  equity markets across countries impact both 
international and  domestic investment activity. We  therefore analyze cross- 
country differences in domestic investment activity to measure the effect of 
differences in the general nature of the intercorporate investment market. 
Table 8.3 reports domestic intercorporate  equity investment activity for each 
of  the sample countries in the period  1985 to 1990, including the aggregate 
dollar value of domestic investments and domestic equity investments for each 
country as a percentage of  the total for all countries. As with international 
investments, domestic activity is largest in the United States, accounting for 
75 percent of  all domestic activity. The United Kingdom has the second most 
active domestic market. Japan, which as previously noted is the target of few 
international acquisitions,  has domestic activity comparable in dollar value to 
that of Australia, France, Italy, and Canada. 
To control for differences in economy sizes across countries, we again de- 
flate domestic equity investments for each country during the period 1985 to 
1990 by its total gross domestic product measured in U.S. dollars in the same 
period. These statistics are reported in table 8.3. Controlled for size, countries 237  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and Why? 
Table 8.3  Domestic Intercorporate  Equity Investments, by Country of Target 
Firm, 1985 to 1990 
Domestic Equity Investments 
Value  Percentage of Gross 
Target Country  (US.  $ millions)  Percentage of Total  Domestic Product 
Australia  $ 36,822  2.5%  2.6% 
Canada  55,047  3.8  2.0 
France  30,003  2.0  0.4 
Italy  2 1,995  1.5  0.4 
Japan  3 1,526  2.2  0.2 
Netherlands  5,442  0.4  0.3 
Spain  5,684  0.4  0.2 
Sweden  15,812  1.1  1.2 
United Kingdom  156,976  10.7  3.3 
United States  1,096,159  74.9  3.9 
West Germany  8,114  0.6  0.1 
Total  1,463,580  100.0 
with the largest domestic investment markets are the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. As in the case of international activity, Japan 
and West  Germany have very  low levels of  domestic intercorporate invest- 
ments. 
To examine whether differences in the intercorporate investment market ex- 
plain both  domestic and international investments equally, we  estimate the 
correlation between the two types of  investment in each country. The cross- 
country  correlation  between  domestic  and  international  investments  as 
percentages of GDP is 0.81. The correlation between country ranks for interna- 
tional and domestic investment adjusted for GDP is 0.77. Both these correla- 
tions, which are highly statistically significant, support the hypothesis that the 
nature of the intercorporate investment market explains a significant proportion 
of the cross-country variation in international investments. 
Differences in Government Regulations 
As discussed above, the differences in the intercorporate investment market 
are potentially driven by  differences in government regulations on corporate 
takeovers and investments. Table 8.4 presents a summary of takeover regula- 
tions for the sample countries in the period  1985 to  1990. The regulations 
examined include government antitrust regulations relevant to intercorporate 
investments, and government and exchange regulations of tender  offer^.^ 
Most nations have antitrust regulations that require government approval of 
4. The primary sources of this information are manuals on mergers published by  Westminster 
Management Consultants Limited (1990),  and Economist Publications (1988). 238  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
Table 8.4  Summary of Special Regulatory Restrictions on Takeovers and 
Equity Investments, by Country, 1985 to 1990 











Mergers resulting in dominant market position must be 
approved by the government. A tender offer must be made 
once an investor acquires 20 percent of the voting stock. 
Mergers are subject to antitrust regulations. Investors with 
more than 10 percent of the outstanding stock must publicly 
disclose their position. Tenders offers must treat all 
shareholders and convertible holders equally. A tender offer 
must be made once an investor acquires 20 percent of the 
voting stock. 
specified market share and sales levels. Investors that own 5 
percent of a listed company have five days to disclose their 
position. All shareholders and convertible holders must be 
treated equally, and public offers must be made once an 
investor acquires 33 percent of the voting stock of a listed 
company. 
No significant antitrust restrictions on mergers. Investors with 
more than 2 percent of a listed company’s stock have thirty 
days to disclose their position. Regulations of public offers 
are by the stock exchanges and are minimal. 
Mergers must be approved by Fair Trade Commission under 
the Anti-Monopoly Law. Tender offers must be filed with 
and approved by Ministry of Finance. 
Few antitrust restrictions on mergers exist. Investors with 10 
percent of shares in a listed company must disclose their 
position in the next prospectus or interim report. Regulation 
of public offers is by the stock exchange and is minimal. 
specified market share and sales levels. Investors with 10 
percent of a listed company’s shares must disclose their 
position immediately. Public offers, which are regulated by a 
government commission, must treat all shareholders and 
convertible holders equally. A tender offer must be made 
once an investor acquires 50 percent of the voting stock. 
investments, including corporate takeovers. Investors with 10 
percent of a company’s shares must disclose their position 
the next day. 
Mergers are subject to antitrust regulations. Investors with 
more than 3 percent of the outstanding stock must publicly 
disclose their position. Investors that own 3 percent of a 
public company’s capital have two business days to disclose 
their position. Tender offers must treat all shareholders and 
convertible holders equally. A tender offer must be made 
once an investor acquires 30 percent of the voting stock. 
enforcement has been rare in recent years. Tender offers 
Mergers are subject to antitrust review if they result in 
Mergers are subject to antitrust review if they result in 
No significant regulations exist governing intercorporate 
Mergers are subject to antitrust regulations, though 239  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and  Why? 
Table 8.4  (continued) 
Country  Description 
must be open for at least twenty days, and shareholders can 
withdraw tendered shares for fifteen days. 
specified sales levels. Investors that own 25 percent of a 
company must disclose their position immediately. There are 
no significant government regulations on public offers. 
West Germany  Mergers are subject to antitrust review if they result in 
mergers between large companies or ones that lead to highly concentrated mar- 
kets. In addition, although not reported in table 8.4, most countries have restric- 
tions on mergers in certain sensitive industries, notably in the airline, banking, 
defense, insurance, and media industries. Most countries also have statutory or 
stock exchange regulations on disclosure of  ownership when specified levels 
are exceeded and on tender offer procedures. The tender offer regulations typi- 
cally include equal treatment of shareholders, required tenders once prespeci- 
fied ownership levels are achieved, and mandatory periods during which offers 
must remain open. There is considerable overlap in the nature of  regulations 
across countries, implying that differences in regulations are unlikely to ex- 
plain differences in international equity investments across target nations. In- 
deed, if anything, it appears that regulations are more severe in countries where 
intercorporate equity investments are common. For example, there are fewer 
regulations governing intercorporate investments in West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden than in the United States, Canada, or the United 
Kingdom. This is not surprising, since the demand for regulation is likely to 
arise only when acquisition activity is high. 
Differences in tax laws across countries could also explain differences in 
intercorporate investments. Scholes and Wolfson  (1990) argue that  in  the 
United States the  1981 and 1986 Tax  Acts had important effects on merger 
activity. The 1981 tax bill permitted very rapid depreciation under the acceler- 
ated cost recovery system, encouraging domestic activity and discouraging in- 
ternational investments. The  1986 act repealed the accelerated depreciation 
write-offs and thus eliminated the bias against foreign equity investors. While 
Scholes and Wolfson report evidence consistent with this prediction, cross- 
sectional evidence is less clear. Graham and Krugman (1989, 39) argue that 
“tax considerations alone would have led one to expect a decline in the relative 
share of Japan and the United Kingdom and a rise in the relative share of Can- 
ada and the Netherlands from 1981 to 1986, followed by a reversal; in fact no 
such clear pattern is visible.” In this paper, we focus on nontax factors to ex- 
plain differences in intercorporate investments across target markets. 
Differences in Corporate Governance 
Intercorporate investments could also be explained by differences in the way 
companies are financed. There are significant differences in ownership struc- 240  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
tures in the countries examined. In Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, ownership is disperse. While financial institutions  play a 
significant role in equity markets, they typically do not participate in corporate 
management. Financial institutions are also willing to trade their ownership 
positions, facilitating  changes in corporate control through takeovers. In Japan, 
and for large publicly held companies in West Germany, corporations have 
established long-term interlocking ownership relations with banks and suppli- 
ers. These owners are reluctant to divest their stakes, presenting a barrier to 
new intercorporate  equity investors, especially those seeking changes in corpo- 
rate control, for both foreign and domestic companies. Public companies in the 
Netherlands typically separate the voting rights of stock from rights to receive 
dividends and return of capital. Voting rights are transferred to a foundation, 
which is friendly to management, and are usually not traded. Finally, in France, 
Italy, Spain, and Sweden, ownership is concentrated in the hands of founding 
families or  government, again  making corporate control transactions less 
likely. 
Among the eleven countries examined, Australia, Canada, the United King- 
dom, and the United States, which have diverse and liquid ownership, have the 
four highest ratios of domestic and international  investments to GDP. The aver- 
age levels of international and domestic equity investments as a percentage of 
GDP for this group of countries are 1 percent and 3 percent, respectively. In 
contrast, in France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Sweden, where there are ownership impediments to takeovers, the average lev- 
els of international and domestic investments as a percentage of GDP are only 
0.2 percent and 0.4 percent. This evidence suggests that the differences in cor- 
porate ownership structure across countries have  an important influence on 
both domestic and foreign intercorporate  investments. 
In summary, variations in international equity investments are explained to 
some extent by the nature of the corporate control market. Differences in own- 
ership structure,  rather than general takeover regulations, appear to be the dom- 
inant factor influencing cross-country variation in domestic and international 
equity investments. 
8.2.3  Effect of Discriminatory Restrictions against Foreign Acquisitions 
As discussed earlier, a second force that influences international equity in- 
vestments is regulatory barriers that favor domestic over foreign investments. 
Whereas differences in the nature of the corporate control market affect both 
foreign and domestic intercorporate  investments, regulations on foreign invest- 
ment affect only international  activity. To explore whether there are regulatory 
barriers to international equity investments, we examine foreign equity invest- 
ments laws for the eleven countries. A summary of these restrictions by coun- 
try is presented in table 8.5.5 
5. The primary sources of this information are manuals on mergers published by  Westminster 
Management Consultants Limited (1990). and Economist Publications (1988). Our discussion is 241  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and Why? 
Table 8.5  Summary of Special Regulatory Restrictions on Foreign 
Intercorporate Equity Investments, by Country, 1985 to 1990 
Country  Description 













The only significant restrictions on foreign investment involve 
acquisitions of companies in sensitive industries, notably 
defense, financial services, and oil and gas companies. 
No significant restrictions exist except for investments in the 
aircraft and banking industries. 
No significant legal restrictions on foreign investment exist. 
No restrictions exist for noncontrolling investments. 
Controlling investments are subject to administrative review, 
which is generally a formality. Prior government approval is 
required for acquisitions in restricted indusries, including 
defense, broadcasting, and air transportation. 
No significant restrictions exist except for investments in the 
media industry. 
No restrictions existed prior to 1988. After 1988, investments 
with national security implications are subject to 
administrative review. 
No significant legal restrictions to foreign investment exist. 
Administrative approval is required for foreign ownership 
exceeding 15 percent for a single investor and 40 percent for 
two or more foreign parties. 
notification for EC members, is required for investments 
exceeding 20 percent voting control. 
Government notification and approval is required for stakes 
exceeding 10 percent. Once approved, a transaction has to 
be completed within thirty days through a Japanese broker. 
Foreign investors can only buy nonrestricted, or “free,” shares. 
Investments of up to 20 percent of voting shares can be 
made with government approval. 
Government approval for non-EC members, and prior 
Canada, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States do not have any significant regulations that discriminate 
between domestic and foreign investments, except in those  few  industries 
deemed to have national security implications. The remaining countries have 
some form of discriminatory regulations. Australia requires administrative ap- 
proval for foreign ownership exceeding 15 percent for a single investor and 40 
percent for two or more parties. France distinguishes between investments by 
members of the European Community EC and other foreign investments and 
requires prior government approval for non-EC investments that exceed 20 per- 
based on regulations in 1990. During 1991, new EC regulations were adopted by member coun- 
tries, liberalizing acquisitions within the community. 242  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
cent of the voting control of a corporation. Japan requires government notifi- 
cation and approval for foreign acquirers of stakes exceeding 10 percent. Once 
approved, a transaction has to be completed within thirty days through a Japa- 
nese broker. Finally, Sweden permits foreign investors to freely purchase only 
nonvoting shares. Investments in voting shares can only be made with govern- 
ment approval. 
As noted above, while international activity is influenced both by the nature 
of the corporate control market and by discriminatory foreign investment regu- 
lations, domestic activity is affected by  the corporate control market alone. 
The ratio of international to domestic equity investments in each country thus 
provides a measure of the marginal effect of discriminatory regulations on in- 
ternational investments. In  Canada, West  Germany, Italy,  the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, countries with few discrim- 
inatory regulations, international investments average 8 1 percent of domestic 
investments. In contrast, the average ratio of international to domestic invest- 
ments is only 28 percent for Australia, France, Japan, and Sweden, indicating 
that the discriminatory regulations in these countries succeed in discouraging 
foreign investment. 
In  summary, there is compelling evidence that cross-country variation in 
equity investments by  target countries is driven by  differences in corporate 
control markets and equity ownership that affect both domestic and interna- 
tional equity investments and by equity investment regulations that discrimi- 
nate against foreign investors. 
8.3  Acquirer Countries 
This section examines which countries have been the most active interna- 
tional acquirers in the period 1985 to 1990 and explores the role of domestic 
activity on countries’ propensity to invest abroad, 
We compute the aggregate dollar value of international investments made 
by each sample country in 1985 to 1990. The findings are reported in column 
(1) of table 8.6. Column (2) reports international equity investments by  each 
country as a percentage of the total for all countries. The United Kingdom is 
the largest acquirer nation, representing 29 percent of all international acquisi- 
tions. France, the United States, and Japan account for approximately 14 per- 
cent each of all international acquisitions. Companies in Spain, Italy, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands undertake very few international acquisitions. 
To  examine whether there has been a change in international investment 
activity by acquirer market between 1985 and 1990, we estimate the value of 
international investments each year for the four major regions (Europe, North 
America, Japan, and Australia). Figure 8.2 shows the annual international in- 
vestments by acquirer regions. Europe (primarily the United Kingdom) is con- 
sistently the largest acquirer region throughout the five years. There is a sig- 
nificant decline in the importance of North American and Australian acquirers 243  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and Why‘! 
Table 8.6  International Intercorporate Equity Investments, by  Country of 
Acquirer Firm, 1985 to 1990 
International Intercorporate Equity Investments 
Percentage 
of  Acquirer 
Percentage  Country’s 
of Gross  Domestic 
Value  Percentage  Domestic  Equity 
Acquirer  (US.  $ millions)  of Total  Product  Investments 
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and a growth in Japanese and European acquirers. In 1985, Europe constituted 
51 percent of  the acquirers, North America had a 31 percent share, Japan 1 
percent, and Australia 16 percent. By  1990, Europe’s share increased to 65 
percent, North America was only 15 percent of the acquisition market, Japan 
16 percent, and Australia 4 percent. 
Once again, we control for differences in economy sizes across countries by 
deflating international equity investments by  each country during the period 
1985 to 1990 by  its total GDP expressed in U.S. dollars in the same period. 
These statistics appear in column (3) of  table 8.6. Controlled for size, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and France are the most active 
international acquirers. Interestingly, the United States is one of the least active 
international acquirers once we control for the size of its economy. 
Table 8.6 also reports two other summary statistics on equity investments 
abroad for the eleven countries. The first, shown in column (4), deflates inter- 
national equity investments for acquirer countries by  domestic investment. 
High  values  of  this  ratio  for  a  particular  country  indicate that  its  firms 
are more active acquirers abroad than domestically. Controlling for domestic 
equity investments, France, West Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands are the 
most active equity investors abroad, and the United States, Spain, and Italy are 





0  +  +  +  t  + 
North America 
I  Europe 
I 
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Fig. 8.2  International intercorporate equity investments, by acquirer market, 
1985 to 1990 
West Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands discourage intercorporate equity 
investments by domestic (and foreign) firms. Apparently, the lack of developed 
corporate control markets in these countries does not represent a significant 
barrier to intercorporate  investment abroad. The experience that firms in coun- 
tries with active domestic markets have in negotiating equity acquisitions and 
in integrating acquired companies does not appear to provide them with a com- 
parative advantage over Dutch, French, West German, or Japanese companies 
(which have no such domestic experience) in investing abroad. Certainly, com- 
panies in France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands can obtain bidding ex- 
pertise for equity investments abroad by hiring experienced investment bank- 
ers. There is also little evidence that United States acquirers, who operate in 
one of the most active domestic markets, have developed expertise in profit- 
ability integrating acquired companies.6 
The second measure, reported in column (5) of table 8.6, deflates interna- 
tional equity investments into a country by its equity investments abroad. Val- 
ues of  this ratio that differ from 100 percent indicate a mismatch between 
6. Jensen and Ruback (1983) surveyed studies of  stock returns to acquiring firms at mergers. 
They concluded that, on average, acquiring firms only break even on mergers and acquisition 
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equity investments into and out of the country. There is a relatively high inflow 
of equity investments into Spain and the United States. Companies in France, 
West Germany, Japan, and Sweden are active acquirers abroad relative to for- 
eign investments in their domestic market. As noted earlier, Japan and Sweden 
both have restrictions on foreign equity investments by outsiders. In addition, 
France, West Germany, Japan, and Sweden all have ownership impediments to 
takeovers and intercorporate equity investments. Thus, the high equity invest- 
ment outflows for these four countries arise because they have equity markets 
that are effectively off limits to foreign investors, but they impose few restric- 
tions on international activity by  their own investors. In contrast, the U.S. 
equity market is characterized by  high liquidity and dispersed stockholders, 
making equity investments by outsiders relatively straightforward. However, it 
is less obvious why U.S. firms are so reluctant to invest abroad. Also, the high 
equity inflows into Spain and Italy cannot be explained by the market for cor- 
porate control or foreign investment regulations in these countries. 
8.4  Factors Explaining International Intercorporate Equity 
Investment Activity 
In this section we use a multivariate model to examine factors that influence 
intercorporate equity investments between countries. The dependent variable 
in our analysis is the annual level of international investment between pairs of 
countries, deflated by  the GDP of the acquirer country to adjust for its size. 
We  explain cross-country and time-series variation in this variable, using a 
number of independent variables drawn from our earlier discussion and prior 
literature. 
Earlier discussion suggested that countries with closely held companies are 
expected to have low levels of foreign equity investments. We  use two mea- 
sures to test this hypothesis. The first is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one for countries with disperse ownership structure (Australia, Can- 
ada, United Kingdom, and United States), and zero for other countries (France, 
West Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Sweden). The second variable is the 
level of domestic equity investment (deflated by  target country GDP), which 
itself is influenced by corporate ownership structure within the target country. 
Of course, domestic equity investments are also affected by other factors, such 
as tax effects, antitrust regulations and enforcement, and tender offer regula- 
tions. Thus, domestic equity investments reflect a broader set of  factors than 
the ownership dummy variable. Both the ownership dummy and domestic in- 
vestment are expected to have a positive relationship with international invest- 
ment levels. 
To  examine whether regulations that discriminate against foreign investors 
effectively reduce international equity investments into a country, we  form a 
dummy variable that is one for target countries with severe discriminatory reg- 
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and zero for other countries. We expect this dummy variable to have a negative 
relationship with the level of foreign equity investments. 
A third variable that we examine is the relative size of the target and acquirer 
countries. Purely as a result of scale difference, small target countries are likely 
to attract less acquirer investment than do large target nations. Consequently, 
this variable is expected to have a positive relationship with acquirer country 
international investments. 
We also examine the effect of changes in real exchange rates on international 
equity investments. In an earlier study, Froot and Stein (1990) argue that, be- 
cause  of  informational  imperfections  in  global  capital  markets,  external 
financing  of  intercorporate  investments is more expensive  than  internal  fi- 
nancing. Consequently, appreciation of a country’s currency increases its com- 
panies’ relative wealth, raising their internal financing capability and lowering 
their  cost of  acquiring foreign firms. We  test this hypothesis by  examining 
the relationship between annual levels of international  investments between 
acquirer and target countries, and contemporaneous and lagged percentage 
changes in average real exchange rates for the target and acquirer countries. 
Annual real exchange rate changes are measured using the International Mone- 
tary Fund index of  the value of  the dollar relative to the target and acquirer 
countries’ currencies and relative changes in consumer prices in the two coun- 
tries. Froot and Stein’s model suggests that foreign  investment is positively 
related to changes in real exchange rates for acquirer countries relative to tar- 
get nations. 
Finally, we explore whether economic growth in the target and acquirer na- 
tions  affects international  investments.  We  estimate contemporaneous  and 
lagged annual economic growth rates for acquirer and target countries, using 
annual percentage change in real GDP index, reported by the IMF. 
There are several reasons why acquirer country growth rates are likely to be 
related  to  international  acquisitions.  First,  countries  with  high  economic 
growth  may  have  developed  a comparative  advantage in managing  certain 
assets. If this knowledge is transferable to other countries, companies in high- 
growth  countries have  incentives  to  make  investments  abr~ad.~  Economic 
growth in the acquirer nation could also be relevant to international investment 
if companies face free cash flow problems. Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that 
moral hazard problems make managers reluctant to pay out free cash flows to 
stockholders. Instead, they prefer to invest in zero or even negatively valued 
projects,  such as equity investments. Consequently, companies in countries 
with high economic growth, which are likely to have high levels of free cash 
flows, are more likely to make equity investments abroad (as well as domesti- 
cally). Finally, if there are market imperfections that restrict firms’ abilities to 
raise external capital for profitable new investments, companies in countries 
7. See Graham and Krugman (1989) for a summary of  the literature on industrial organization 
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with high economic growth, and high internal cash flows, will have access to 
cheaper funding for new investments, including those in other countries. Each 
of these hypotheses implies a positive relationship between acquirer country 
economic growth and changes in international equity investments. However, 
there are also factors that would cause the relationship to be negative. If high 
economic growth in a country provides significant new investment opportuni- 
ties within the country for both domestic and foreign firms, domestic firms will 
tend to concentrate on home-country investments rather than investing abroad. 
Because these conflicting hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, it is difficult 
to make predictions on the sign of the acquirer growth coefficient. 
Target country economic growth is included to test whether foreign equity 
investors  are  attracted to  countries which  have  high  growth prospects  or 
whether they are more attracted to countries which have underperformed and 
where there may be opportunities to turn around poorly performing companies. 
We  test the above hypotheses using panel data to estimate the relationship 
of annual levels of international equity investments between a given acquirer 
and target country (deflated by  acquirer country GDP) in the years 1985 to 
1990 to the above independent variables. The findings are reported in table 8.7. 
Model 1 is estimated using the ownership dummy variable, whereas model 2 
uses domestic equity investments in the target country instead of the owner- 
ship dummy. 
The results are consistent across the two models. Model 1 has an adjusted 
R2 of  19 percent and statistically is highly significant. Four variables-the 
ownership dummy, the foreign regulation dummy, lagged acquirer growth, and 
the relative size of the target and acquirer nations-have  statistically signifi- 
cant relations with international equity acquisitions.s 
To understand the economic implications of  the reported coefficients, we 
note that the average investment between a pair of countries in the sample is 
0.09 percent of the acquirer country’s GDP. The coefficient on the ownership 
variable implies that, at the margin, disperse equity ownership increases inter- 
national equity investments by 0.16 percent of acquirer GDP. The dummy vari- 
able for discriminatory restrictions on foreign investment is -0.07  percent, 
implying that countries with such restrictions are effective in dampening for- 
eign investment. The coefficient on lagged target growth is positive, indicating 
that high-growth countries tend to attract foreign investment. A one percentage 
point increase in real GDP target growth increases international equity acquisi- 
tions by 0.02 percent of  acquirer GDP. Finally, the relative size of the target 
and acquirer is important in determining the level of international investment 
between the two countries. 
The coefficient on exchange rate changes is insignificant, suggesting that 
8. Because the models have  several contemporaneous and lagged independent  variables, we 
examine whether our findings are influenced by multicollinearity. The results are unchanged when 
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Table 8.7  Relationship of Annual Intercorporate Equity Investments between 
Acquirer and Target Countries, as a Percentage of Acquirer GDP in 
the period 1985 to 1990, to Target Domestic and Acquirer Country 
Characteristics 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable*  Model 1  Model 2 
1.97t 
foreign investments  -0.07t  -0.08t 
ownership  0.16t 
as a percentage of target GDP 
and target countries  -0.003  -0.03 
countries  0.003  -0.06 
acquirer country  -0.80  -0.55 
country  0.12  -0.74 
target country  -1.52  -0.88 
Target country GDP as a percentage of acquirer country GDP  2.247 
Dummy variable for target countries with restrictions on 
Dummy variable for target countries with disperse equity 
Contemporaneous  target country domestic equity investment 
Contemporaneous  change in exchange rate between acquirer 
Lagged change in exchange rate between acquirer and target 
Contemporaneous  percentage change in real GDP growth for 
Lagged percentage change in real GDP growth for acquirer 
Contemporaneous  percentage change in real GDP growth for 
Lagged percentage change in real GDP growth for target 
0.07t 
country  1.84$  0.69 
Adjusted R2  0.19t  0.24t 
Number of observations  658  65  8 
*The dependent varible is the annual change in intercorporate  equity investments between acquirer 
and target countries as a percentage of acquirer GDP in the period 1985 to 1990. 
+Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, using a two-tailed test. 
$Significantly different from zero at the 6 percent level, using a two-tailed test. 
Intercept  0.01  0.02 
there are not serious informational imperfections across countries for equity 
investments. These results differ somewhat from those in other studies (see 
Froot and Stein 1991; Caves 1989; Dewenter 1992). Differences in samples, 
variable definitions, and the scope of the countries studied make it difficult to 
directly compare our results with these studies. However,  to assess the ro- 
bustness of  our results, we  repeat our analysis by  (1) allowing the exchange 
rate coefficient to vary by country, (2) introducing exchange rate changes with 
one more lag, (3) changing the dependent variable to changes in international 
investment rather than levels, and (4)  changing the independent variable to an 
index representing the level of exchange rates between the acquirer and target 
countries. The exchange rate coefficient remains insignificant in these specifi- 
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Finally, there is no significant relationship between changes in international 
activity and contemporaneous and lagged acquirer country growth. There are 
two interpretations for this finding. One interpretation is that acquirer growth 
rates do not play an important role in determining international equity invest- 
ment flows. Alternatively, as discussed above, the insignificant coefficients are 
a result of conflicting effects of acquirer growth on international investment. 
Model 2, which replaces the ownership dummy with domestic equity invest- 
ments in target nations, generally reinforces the above findings. The coefficient 
on domestic investments is positive and highly significant. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the nature of the corporate control market has an im- 
portant effect on international equity investments. This coefficient probably 
also captures other factors, such as growth opportunities, that  make target 
countries attractive to acquirers. There is some evidence of this. The adjusted 
R2 increases from 19 percent in model 1 to 24 percent in model 2, and the 
effect of lagged target growth, which no longer has a significant coefficient, 
appears to be subsumed by the domestic investment variable. 
8.5  Conclusions 
This paper examines international intercorporate equity investments among 
eleven of the leading industrial nations during the period 1985 to  1990. We 
find that these investments grew tenfold in the sample period and currently 
account for about 30 percent of  all equity investments. In dollar terms, the 
United States is by far the largest target country for international equity invest- 
ments and accounts for 60 percent of  all international investments between 
1985 and  1990. However, when we  control for differences in country size, 
the United States ranks only third among target countries (behind the United 
Kingdom and Canada). 
The United Kingdom is the most active acquirer nation, both in dollar terms 
and adjusting for country size, and accounts for 29 percent of all international 
acquisitions. U.S.,  French, and Japanese companies are also large acquirers 
in dollar terms, and each accounts for about 14 percent of  worldwide equity 
investments. However, when we  control for country size, the United States 
ranks tenth out of eleven countries in investments abroad. 
International activity in target countries is in part explained by  (1) regula- 
tions that seek to deter foreign investment, (2) differences across countries in 
ownership structure and corporate control markets, and (3) target countries’ 
recent growth. Neither changes in real exchange rates between target and ac- 
quirer countries nor growth rates of  acquirer countries is an important factor 
explaining international investments patterns. 250  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
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Comment  Michael Adler 
Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu’s paper makes a contribution by drawing atten- 
tion  to  and confirming a point we  have long suspected and possibly even 
known to be true: that regulatory or structural restrictions on takeovers and 
foreign ownership can significantly  reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
those countries that have them. The authors make this point, among others, in 
connection with data from a sample of developed, primarily (with the excep- 
tion of Australia) Northern Hemisphere, nations. 
Most northern policymakers, however, no longer view FDI as a policy prob- 
lem, aside from national security concerns in specific industries and the chal- 
lenge of leveling competitive conditions between Japan and the rest. Healy and 
Palepu’s (H&P’s) demonstration, in tables 8.2 and 8.3, that foreign and domes- 
tic intercorporate equity purchases are a much larger fraction of  GDP in the 
English-speaking countries than in the more restrictive EC is therefore unlikely 
to raise either eyebrows or hackles in the North. Nor is their table 8.6 result 
that France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan have invested abroad propor- 
tionally much more than they have absorbed. North-North political-economic 251  International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who, Where, and Why? 
relations are unlikely to be greatly affected by  the revelation of  these imbal- 
ances. 
H&P’s point matters much more in the context of  the ongoing difficulties 
over resource transfers between North and South and between West and East. 
Debtor countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and even Africa cur- 
rently are being encouraged by  their creditors to reconstruct their economies 
to attract voluntary FDI as a substitute for aid. One implication of H&P’s work 
is that removing barriers to intercorporate takeovers in the debtor nations can 
assist this process. A second, indirect, and more problematic implication fol- 
lows from observing that Germany and Japan, the most successful postwar 
economies, are among those with the highest barriers to takeovers. One may 
wonder about cause and effect. Are the debtors being well advised? 
Appropriately enough, H&P have nothing to say regarding these wider is- 
sues. Their technical concern is with the pattern of facts that can be obtained 
from exploiting Securities Data Company’s new database on international ac- 
quisitions between January 1985 and December 1990. The model they estimate 
in table 8.7 is not a test of any theory of FDI. It seems instead to be a prelimi- 
nary attempt to see whether barriers to FDI, modeled by dummy variables for 
ownership structure and the presence of discriminatory regulations, properly 
belong in the specification of  such a theory. Their methodology is not de- 
scribed in detail. It seems to consist of a pooled time-series, cross-section re- 
gression analysis that stops short of being an event study. 
Their results confirm, as noted above, that the FDI barrier variables have the 
right signs and are significant at the 1 percent level. Large target markets attract 
more FDI than do smaller markets. And, echoing Caves’s (1989) investigation 
of  FDI in the United States, FDI is positively related to GDP growth in the 
acquiring country but not to growth in the target. Perhaps what is missing here 
is a stock market or comparable relative wealth variable. Caves has the intu- 
itively appealing result that FDI into the United States between 1979 and 1986 
had a strong negative correlation with U.S. stock prices. This effect, one sur- 
mises, should be quite general: purchases of foreign firms should go down as 
their prices rise. 
The chief surprise in the H&P paper is that the contemporaneous and lagged 
exchange rate variables turned out not to be significant. However, this may be 
less of  a surprise than one might think. Keep in mind that the empirical evi- 
dence of a strong association between FDI and exchange rates pertains almost 
exclusively to FDI into the United States. This is true of  Caves (1990), who 
was first to report a significant negative correlation between the strength of the 
dollar and inward FDI. It is equally true of Froot and Stein (1991), who offered 
an attractive, imperfect-markets explanation of  why this result is to be ex- 
pected, as well as of Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (chap. 9 in this 
book), and Dewenter (1992). However, Froot and Stein could not find any asso- 
ciation between outward U.S. FDI and the exchange rate. Neither could De- 
wenter, who found also that Japan and the United Kingdom were the only 252  Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu 
countries whose FDI into the United States was negatively correlated with dol- 
lar strength. FDI outflows to the United States from Germany and the Nether- 
lands were uncorrelated with the dollar exchange rate. They were, however, 
correlated with stock market measures of relative wealth. 
The evidence, even in the case of the United States as target, seems some- 
what mixed. The relationship between FDI and exchange rates (proxying im- 
perfectly for shifts of  relative wealth) may  differ across acquiring countries 
and possibly also between time periods. The H&P sample, however, also in- 
cludes FDI flows between non-U.S. country pairs. Whereas the dollar lost 50 
percent of its value against other major currencies between 1985 and 1990, the 
cross-rates were much less volatile. The wave of intra-European mergers and 
acquisitions that began to form in the mid  1980s must therefore have been 
prompted less by exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System 
(or by U.S.-type buyout fever) than by other factors such as the EC’s movement 
to a unified market and the resulting potential for scale economies. The inclu- 
sion of  intra-European transactions could be expected to reduce the average 
sensitivity of FDI to exchange rates. In addition, effective structural and regu- 
latory barriers to FDI into Europe from the English-speaking countries and 
Japan, or from all countries into Japan, would tend to have the same effect: 
effective barriers should reduce the average sample correlation between FDI 
and relative wealth changes. All told, the absence of significant exchange rate 
coefficients in H&P’s results is no more than one would expect. 
In summary, Healy and Palepu provide a necessary addition to the FDI liter- 
ature. They contribute by showing that imperfections other than informational 
asymmetries in financial markets that produce wealth effects, also affect FDI 
takeovers. We  are still far from a complete model of FDI. The work can use- 
fully continue. 
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Discussion Summary 
Kathryn Dewenter pointed out that she found foreign acquisitions in the United 
States were, on average, larger transactions than were U.S. domestic acquisi- 
tions. Would the results on the relative importance of foreign acquisitions be 
affected by taking size into account? Dewenter suggested that it would be easy 
enough to determine the answer, as it is possible to get data on the number 
of transactions. 
Bob Lipsey suggested that Healy and Palepu attempt to compare their data 
on cross-border equity purchases with U.S. data on foreign acquisitions in the 
United  States. This comparison might help determine how  comprehensive 
SDC data are. In addition, Lipsey questioned the meaning of  several of  the 
explanatory variables in  the  Healy-Palepu regressions.  For  example, why 
should the GDP of the headquarters country of the acquirer be important? Why 
is the exchange rate of  the headquarters country important? Presumably, if 
these firms earn profits in several other countries, then the GDPs and exchange 
rates of  these other countries should be important, not those of the headquar- 
ters country. 
David Belli noted that he had already examined the SDC data. He had found 
that it was good at picking up some of the transactions missing from the U.S. 
International Trade Commission data on  foreign investment in  the  United 
States. However, the  SDC data also omitted a number of  important trans- 
actions. 
Michael Dooley wondered whether the increase in FDI in the United States 
was somehow related to the leveraging process that at large portion of the cor- 
porate sector experienced in the late 1980s. If  foreigners were randomly in- 
volved in these takeovers, that would lead to an increase in FDI. This Page Intentionally Left Blank